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TREATIES AS LAW IN NATIONAL COURTS:
LATIN AMERICA*
Ernesto Dihigo**
The problem of the validity of international treaties and their
application by the courts of one of the contracting States arises
mainly in connection with claims of private individuals affected
by said conventions. Leaving aside the question of whether
States are the only subjects of international law or whether
individuals may also be such, there is no doubt that while some
treaties are effective only as regards the contracting States,
others do affect the interests of private persons.
When a conflict regarding the fulfillment of a treaty arises
between the respective governments, the courts of one of the
parties are not prone to intervene, because as Hyde has said,
the other "contracting State, complaining of the infraction of
the treaty, is believed to be justified in declining to admit that
its rights under the agreement can be ultimately determined
by a foreign local court without the consent of each party to the
agreement."' At times, it does not even accept that jurisdiction
to decide upon the rights of its citizens. In those cases the con-
troversy will have to be decided through diplomatic negotia-
tions or by an international tribunal.
Therefore, the result will be that generally the courts of a
country will intervene when a citizen of that country establishes
a claim under the terms of an international treaty. This does
not preclude the possibility that the courts will also intervene on
petition of a foreigner appearing before them.
In my view, the study of the application of treaties by na-
tional courts requires the consideration of the following matters:
A. When a treaty is binding upon national courts.
B. The nature of the treaty; its equivalence to the law.
*A paper presented at the Mid-South Regional Conference on International
Law and Foreign Trade, sponsored for the American Society of International Law
by the Louisiana State Bar Association and the Louisiana State University Law
School, at Baton Rouge, La., April 19, 1956.
**Dean and Professor of Law, University of Havana; Director, Inter-American
Academy of Comparative and International Law, Havana.
1. 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 56 (1922).
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C. Application of the treaty by national courts.
D. The problems that the application of the treaty may bring
up.
In accordance with what has been requested of me for this
discussion, we will look into these questions in connection with
the Latin-American countries, showing general tendencies there
without going into details that would lengthen this paper un-
necessarily.
A. WHEN A TREATY IS BINDING UPON NATIONAL COURTS
The conclusion of a treaty involves the following stages: (a)
the negotiations; (b) the ratification by the proper constitu-
tional body; (c) the exchange of ratificiations; (d) the promul-
gation or publication.
Negotiation of Treaties
All Latin-American Constitutions vest in the President of the
Republic, either alone or with the intervention of his Cabinet,
the power to carry on the diplomatic relations of the country
and the conclusion of international treaties.
2
Ratification of Treaties
But the treaty, once it has been signed by the representatives
of the contracting States, must be submitted for approval to
another constitutional organ. In two countries (Cuba and
Mexico), just as is the case in the United States, it is the Senate
exclusively, while in the remaining countries it is the full Leg-
islative Power either through the single assembly in unicameral
systems, or through the Senate and the House of Representatives
in those using the bicameral system.
Such approval is essential. Some constitutions (Cuba, ar-
ticle 142-g; Venezuela, article 81-3) expressly provide that with-
out such approval the treaty will have no validity; and this pro-
vision should be considered applicable in all countries even
though it has not been expressly stated constitutionally.
2. On this topic see Turlington, The Control of Foreign Relations Under the
constitutions of the American Republics, in 4 CURSOS MONOGRAFICQS OF THE
INTER-AMERICAN ACADEMY OF COMPARATIVE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 187
(1954).
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In this connection we should now consider the value of the
so-called "executive agreements," that is, international agree-
ments entered into by the Executive alone and not submitted
later to the approval of the Legislative Power. Considerable use
of these agreements was made during the Second World War
and thereafter, and they have served to facilitate international
relations and to solve urgent problems or those that should be
kept secret. As long as their effects are maintained within the
sphere of the interested governments and are carried out by
them, no difficulties of an international order will be encoun-
tered. But I believe that under a system that requires approval
by the Legislative Power, such agreements lack legal validity and
are not binding on the State. This consequence is still more
evident in those countries whose Constitutions provide (Cuba
and Venezuela) that without legislative approval treaties have
no validity. Let us state, however, that in Venezuela treaties are
valid, even without such approval, when they deal with the
execution of pre-existing obligations of the State and in other
specific cases, and that "those international treaties, conventions
or agreements may be provisionally carried out, where the
urgency of the case so demands it."
If there has been no legislative approval, I believe that the
courts of our countries would consider that the treaty lacks
validity and binding force. And even before an international
court the problem should receive the same solution, at least in
our continent, since that is the general opinion, as we shall see
further on.8
We may also mention at this time the problem that arises
when the Chief of State ratifies a treaty without having obtained
the prior approval of the Legislative Power required by the Con-
stitution. I will merely say that although some authors, mainly
those from Europe, believe that the declaration of the Chief of
State is conclusive, the majority maintain an opinion to the con-
trary. "The majority of writers," says the distinguished Ameri-
can internationalist Mr. Charles G. Fenwick, "maintain that for-
eign governments should be held to a knowledge of the constitu-
tional prerequisites of ratification in each country with which
they are 'dealing; and they insist that a treaty which has been
ratified without the proper observance of those requirements is
3. JIMANEZ DE ARACHAGA, CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 86, 87 (mimeo-
graphed shorthand notes by J. B. Miguez, 1949).
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ipso facto invalid, whatever the proclamation of the head of the
State may assert in that respect." 4
Accepting that doctrine, the Inter-American Convention on
Treaties adopted at Havana in £928 states in article 1 that
"treaties will be concluded by the competent authorities of the
State or by its representatives, according with their respective
internal law." 5 And article 21 of the Harvard Draft is still
more conclusive: "A State is not bound by a treaty made on its
behalf by an organ or authority not competent under its law to
conclude the treaty; however, a State may be responsible for
an injury resulting to another State from reasonable reliance by
the latter upon a representation that such organ or authority was
competent to conclude the treaty."
Regardless of what might be the fate and validity of any
such treaty in an international order, I believe that in the
internal ambit of the country the national courts of Latin-
America would decide not to grant validity to a treaty that has
not been constitutionally ratified. The Supreme Court of Cuba
has said (Decision 67 of May 5, 1930, in a contentious-admin-
istrative matter) that international treaties have the force of
law "once they have been legally approved by the signatory
States."
Ratification has become a normal requisite at least in
America. In article 5 of the Convention on Treaties above re-
ferred to, "treaties are obligatory only after ratification by the
contracting states, even though this condition is not stipulated
in the full powers of the negotiators or does not appear in the
treaty itself."
The well-known Brazilian diplomat and jurist, Hildebrando
4. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 436 (3d ed. 1948); 1 PLANAS SUAREZ,
TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PtmBLICO 153 (1916).
5. Though this convention has been ratified only by seven countries (Brazil,
Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua, Panamfi, Peru, and Dominican Republic) its approval
by the Sixth International Conference of American States of 1928 (Havana)
reveals the communis opinio of the Continent. The fact that an Inter-American
treaty is not ratified by an American State does not necessarily imply that such
State is in disagreement with the treaty. In this respect the Belgian interna-
tionalist Paul de Visscher has said that "it is a sufficiently constant practice in
the countries of Latin-America to abide by, treaties that have not been regularly
ratified. This practice is better explained when the said treaty does not create a
new norm but is willing to recognize the existence of a rule generally admitted
by international law, a rule which, on the other hand, corresponds to a norm of
international law of the greater part of the States which it covers." DR VISSCHEa,
DE LA CONCLUSION DES TRAITtS INTERNATIONAUX 218 (1943).
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Accioly, confirms what has been stated above by saying that
"the writers are in agreement in accepting the principle of the
need of ratification in order to give binding force to treaties." 6
Exchange of Ratifications
The approval of a treaty by the proper constitutional organ
is followed by the exchange or deposit of ratifications which
marks the moment when the treaty becomes binding on the con-
tracting governments. "Treaties," provides article 8 of the
aforementioned Convention, "shall become effective from the
date of exchange or deposit of ratification, unless some other
date has been agreed upon through an express provision."
Promulgation of Treaties
Article 4 of the same Convention orders that "treaties shall
be published immediately after the exchange of ratifications.
the failure to discharge this international duty shall affect
neither the force of treaties nor the fulfillment of the obliga-
tions stipulated therein." We should bear in mind the distinc-
tion we have made above between conventions that affect only
the States themselves and those that affect private individuals.
When a treaty falls under the first group I believe that it is
binding on the signatory states from the time of the exchange
of ratifications. But as has been said by the Chilean writer
Cruchaga Tocornal, "when the treaty imposes some obligations
on individuals or creates some rights in their favor, promulga-
tion is necessary in order that the subjects may be in a position
to fulfil the former or demand the latter."' 7 And Bustamante,
the great Cuban internationalist says that "promulgation is a
duty of the ratifying states; but the binding effects will begin
only from the time of ratification and in accordance with the
terms of such ratification and with the text of the treaty."
S
If a treaty, as we shall see, has the equivalence of a law, to
assume that it will govern as far as citizens are concerned with-
out having been published is the same as maintaining the pos-
sibility that a law is effective for private individuals without
having been promulgated.
6. 2 ACCIOLY, TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PtBLICO, no. 1278-A
(1946).
7. 1 CRUCHAGA TOCORNAL, NocIoNES DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL, no. 573 (3d
ed. 1923).
8. 3 BUSTAMANTE, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PtBLICO, no. 757 (1936).
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B. THE NATURE OF THE TREATY
How is it that a treaty, an act of the State in the sphere of
its foreign relations, has the effectiveness of an internal law?
In pure doctrine, and in accordance with the dualistic concept
of Triepel, who assigns to international law and to internal law
spheres of action that are entirely different, a treaty does not
become effective within a State except through an act of express
recognition, for instance, by a law. Under the monistic theory
of Kelsen, the law is only one whether it be international or
internal and, inasmuch as the former is admitted to have su-
premacy over the latter, a treaty governs directly per se and
prevails over an internal norm in conflict therewith.
Due to the brevity of our study we will leave aside this theo-
retical discussion in order to go into the problem in the positive
legislation of our countries in which we will find an intermediate
solution. In fact, due to the procedure that requires that treaties
be approved by the Legislative Power it has been admitted that
once the convention has been concluded with all the aforemen-
tioned constitutional reguisities, it becomes effective within the
territory of the State without the need of a law expressly to
put it into effect. That is why the Latin-American writers, in
general, agree in granting a treaty the same force as a national
law.
There is a first group of constitutions, such as those of
Argentina (article 22), Mexico (article 133) and Paraguay (ar-
ticle 4) which, following the form of that of the United States
(article VI, clause 2) provide that treaties, together with the
Constitution and the laws enacted by Congress, are the supreme
law of the nation. It is evident that in those countries, such as
the United States and Mexico in which the approval or ratifica-
tion of the treaty is given only by the Senate, such a declaration
is the same as saying that the legislative function is not exer-
cised exclusively by Congress, but also by the President of the
Republic and the Senate through international treaties. This
observance is applicable to Cuba, because in Cuba the Senate
alone ratifies international conventions and these, as we shall
see, have the force of law.
A second group of eighteen countries present no problem on
this question, because in them the treaties must be approved by
1956]
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the whole Congress, whether this be bicameral9 or unicameral 10
since that approval, even though it is not exactly a law, gives
the treaty the same efficacy as a law.
A third category is constituted by Cuba. Our Constitution
contains no declaration similar to that of Argentina, Mexico,
Paraguay, and the United States, in the sense of saying that
treaties are laws. Yet, at the same time, our Legislative Power
is comprised of two bodies (the House and the Senate) but only
the Senate must approve the international conventions, except
those that are peace treaties which must also be submitted to the
House. It would be therefore possible to argue that a treaty is
not equivalent to a law since it has not been approved by the
House of Representatives.
The matter was very wisely decided upon by our Cuban Su-
preme Court (Decision No. 8 of March 10, 1911, in a matter of
constitutionality) in declaring that treaties "are equal to the
laws under several aspects and chiefly as to the binding force
of their provisions for the citizens in the contracting nations."
In another decision (No. 77 of May 5, 1930, in a contentious-
administrative matter) it said that "international treaties, once
approved in a legal manner by the signatory states, as far as
they are concerned have the same force as its laws." And on
May 19, 1932 (Decision No. 129, in a contentious-administrative
matter) it declared that "the Paris Convention on the Protection
of Trade-Marks and Patents which was signed by the represen-
tatives of Cuba in Washington on February 20, 1929 and promul-
gated in the Gazette of May 24, 1930, . . . is a law of the Re-
public."
Those declarations were made under the terms of the 1901
Cuban Constitution, but since the 1940 Constitution now in force
is substantially the same on the problem that we are considering,
the decision No. 66 of June 28, 1944 (in a matter of constitu-
tionality) repeats the declaration made in No. 8 of 1911 (men-
tioned above), to the effect that the treaties are on an equal
basis as the laws with regard to the binding force of their norms.
Among Latin-American writers the general opinion confirms
9. Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti,
Nicaragua, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Also Argentina.
10. Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Panama. Also Para-
guay.
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what has been heretofore stated: a treaty is in the nature of a
national law."
C. APPLICATION OF THE TREATY BY NATIONAL COURTS
Having established the foregoing principle that may be con-
sidered unanimous in the countries of Latin-America, let us now
consider the matter regarding the effectiveness of treaties in
an internal order and the process of their interpretation and ap-
plication by the national courts.
In this respect a distinction must be drawn between two
classes of treaties: (a) those that we might call self-executing,
that is, those whose provisions may be directly applied by the
courts because they are sufficient in themselves and do not
need to be complemented by any other measure or law; and (b)
those that might be called supplemented performance which, due
to the insufficiency of their terms, require a supplementary law
in order to be applied.
With regard to the former there is no doubt that they should
be applied by the courts exactly under the same conditions as
the national laws are applied, and this has been the case in Cuba
where treaties have been applied not only by the Supreme Court
but also by lower courts every time that a rule established by
an international treaty has been brought before them. And in so
doing, these courts are of course empowered to interpret the
treaties and determine their scope and their concerte effects,
the same as they do with the national laws. 12
With regard to the latter I believe that the same rule that
has been accepted by the courts of the United States should
govern, a rule Hyde has summarized as follows: "In the case
of a treaty requiring a legislative enactment in order to make
11. PLANAS SUAREZ, TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PrYBLICO 151
(1916); 3 BUSTAMANTE, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PFtBLICO 396 (1936); Ruiz
Moreno, Relaciones entre el derecho nacional y el derecho internacional en Amdr-
ica, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS 88 (1940) ;
Cruchago Ossa, Relaciones entre el derecho internacional y las legislacioneo na-
cionales, in 10 PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS 53
(1940).
12. The following are decisions of the Supreme Court of Cuba in which inter-
national treaties were interpreted and applied: 67 (Cont-Adm.), September 13,
1907; 5 (Inconst.), June 3, 1909, 57 (Civil), June 28, 1909; 59 (Cont-Adm.),
November 1, 1917, 62 (Civil), July 21, 1921; 8 (Inconst.), March 19, 1930; 67
(Cont-Adm.), May 5, 1930; 129 (Cont-Adm.), May 19, 1932; 348 (Cont-Adm.),
November 2, 1932; 33 (Inconst.), April 28, 1937; 578 (Cont-Adm.), October 5,
1949. Of the Court of Appeals of Havana: Auto 420, December 24, 1931.
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its provisions effective, the courts of the United States do not
regard the agreement as one to be enforced by them until the
requisite legislative action is taken."'13
There is no decision of the Supreme Court in Cuba that
settles this question; but the problem has been brought up be-
fore it with respect to certain articles of the 1940 Constitution
which made changes in the national legislation. The court had
to make a distinction between two kinds of constitutional rules:
one, which it declared of possible direct application, and others,
with regard to which it stated that their application would nec-
essarily require a supplementary act of Congress, and inasmuch
as that law had not been enacted, it was impossible to apply the
constitutional provision.14 As may be seen, this is the same prob-
lem as that of the treaties requiring supplemented execution.
Therefore, it is to be expected that the solution would be
identical.
When a State signs a convention, the execution of which re-
quires that the other State enact a supplementary law, it knows
that it cannot expect the courts of that country to apply the
treaty until such a law is enacted. There is no doubt that the
convention will have created the obligation of enacting the law
since, as the Permanent Court of International Justice (Con-
sultative Opinion No. 10 of February 21, 1925) has said, "a
State that validly contracted international obligations is obliged
to make in its legislation such changes as may be necessary to
assure the execution of the commitments acquired." Although
the Legislative Power cannot be compelled to enact the law if
it does not wish to do so, its refusal or omission is a violation
of the convention and the other party thereto will have the right
to establish a claim through diplomatic channels or before an
international tribunal, as the case may be; however, the national
courts in the interim would be prevented from applying the
treaty.
D. PROBLEMS ARISING FROM THE VALIDITY OF A TREATY
The efficacy of a treaty within the State poses to the jurist
and the practicing attorney complicated problems. We are going
13. 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 58 (1922), who quotes the following de-
cisions: Haver v. Yaker, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 32 (1869) ; United States v. Perche-
man, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51 (1833) ; Foster and Elam v. Neilson, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.)
253, 314 (1829).
14. See decision No. 58, p. 162, Jurisp. al Dia 1944 (June 22, 1944).
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to refer to a few of these problems briefly: (a) conflict between
a treaty and the Constitution; (b) conflict between a treaty
and the national law; (c) retroactive effects of a treaty. The
first two aspects must be considered at the same time with re-
gard to the constitutions or the law prior to the treaty and to
the Constitution and the law enacted after the treaty.
Conflict between a treaty and the Constitution. What is the
solution when the treaty conflicts with a preexisting constitu-
tional rule? The Constitutions of Argentina (article 19), El
Salvador (article 46, No. 29), Mexico (article 133), and Nica-
ragua (article 324) expressly state in one way or another that
treaties should be in accord with the Constitution. In the other
countries, even though not expressly stated, the principle that
treaties cannot infringe upon the Constitution is implied. We
have already seen that they are equal to the law in their force
and effect and we know that within the juridical conceptions
of our countries and the so-called hierarchy of the norms, the
Constitution always predominates over the law.
Of course there is a contrary opinion, especially in Europe.
"International practice," says Georges Scelle, "tends to admit
that the internal legislation, even when constitutional, cannot
establish rules contrary to positive international law; that if
there is a conflict between the constitutional rules and the trea-
ties, the constitutional provisions shall ipso facto be considered
null and void; and that finally it is impossible to invoke pre-
vious constitutional rules for the purpose of refusing to apply a
treaty."'15 And among Latin-American internationalists, Mr. Ac-
cioly of Brazil seems to share this opinion. We can even recall
that the Permanent Court of International Justice (Consultative
Opinion of February 4, 1932) proclaimed that "a State cannot
adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a view
to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international
law or treaties in force."
But in my opinion the general tendency in America is to the
contrary. Perhaps due to the greater importance that we ascribe
to the Constitution, or because we have a more solemn or more
rigid conception of it, we maintain that any rule is invalid,
whether of a law or of a treaty, that infringes upon the Con-
15. Quoted by 2 AccIoLy, TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL P TBLICO, nO.
1252 (1946).
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stitution. In this respect several authors may be mentioned,
such as Sol6rzano, Alvarado Garaicoa (Ecuador), Ruiz Mo-
reno'6 (Argentina), and Cruchaga (Chile), the last of whom cites
a decision of the Supreme Court of Chile of 1917 which declared
that such a conflict should be decided by the constitutional rules
in preference to those of international law.
Although the consideration of this subject with regard to the
courts of the United States is to be handled today by my excel-
lent friend and outstanding internationalist, Mr. Quincy Wright;
relying on his benevolent consent and in that of those listening
to me, I will make a few observations due to the great impor-
tance that the doctrine of the United States Supreme Court has
on this subject throughout the rest of the continent.
In the first place, I believe that not one single instance can
be cited of a treaty that has been declared unconstitutional by
the courts of the United States. But its Supreme Court has
made incidental declarations on the problem. Thus in the case
of Thomas v. Gay (169 U.S. 264 [1897]) it said that "a treaty
cannot change the Constitution of the United States or be held
valid if it be in violation of this instrument." Other cases that
I have seen cited are those of Fort Leavenworth Railroad Com-
pany v. Low (114 U.S. 525 [1885]), and Geofroy v. Riggs (133
U.S. 258 [1889]). And yet it seems to me the case that is cited
as being contrary to that thesis, that is, Missouri v. Holland (252
U.S. 416 [1920]) has been made to say more than it really ex-
presses.
In the American doctrine we also find writers who share the
same opinion that a treaty cannot prevail against the Constitu-
tion; and although Fenwick maintains that the foreign State
has the right "to take the approval of the Senate and the subse-
quent ratification of the treaty by the President as a final de-
cision in respect to the constitutionality of the treaty," he im-
16. Sol6rzano, La obligatoriedad de los tratados internacionales en 1as rela-
ciones privadas, in REV. DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (LA HABANA) 22 (Septem-
ber 1930) ; ALVARADO GARAICOA, PRINCIpIOS NORMATIVOS DEL DERECHO INTERNA-
CIONAL 34 (1946) ; Ruiz Moreno, Relaciones entre el dereeho nacional y el derecho
internacional en Amdriea, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC
CONGRESS 88 (1940) ; Cruchaga Ossa, Relaciones entre el derecho internacional y
las legislaciones nacionales, in 10 PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH AMERICAN SCIEN-
TIFIC CONGRESS 60 (1940); JIMItNEZ DE ARCHAGA, CURSO DE DERECHO INTER-
NACIONAL 84 (mimeographed shorthand notes by J. B. Miguez, 1949) ; RABASA,
EL DERECHO INTERNO Y EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 101 (1933). See also Los
tratados en el derecho constitutional Mexicano, in EL FoRO 197 (June 1948).
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mediately adds that in that case it is necessary to take the neces-
sary steps to obtain the derogation of the treaty. 17
Consequently, and due to the generality of the opinions re-
garding the predominance of the Constitution, I do not believe
that any national court in our countries would maintain the
validity of a treaty as against a constitutional provision.
Another aspect of the problems of an international conven-
tion in conflict with the Constitution arises when, after the ef-
fective date of a treaty, the Constitution is amended and rules
in conflict with such treaty are inserted therein.
Should the question be decided by an international tribunal
I believe the decision would be in the sense that the new consti-
tutional rule does not affect the full validity of the treaty and
the State would be ordered to fulfill it or to make indemnity. 8
But in an internal order (which is the subject of our study) it
seems to me impossible for a national court to decide in the same
way, because the principle that the Constitution annuls a prior
law that contravenes it is common, not only because it, in itself,
is a later law, but also because of the doctrine of the hierarchy
of the juridical rules under which the Constitution always pre-
vails over all others.1 9
Let us not lose sight of the fact that there are sixteen Latin-
American countries (Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cuba, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Uruguay, and Venezuela) whose
Constitutions vest in the judicial power the authority to decide
upon the constitutionality of the laws. That is, in all of them,
a power of the State which has not taken part in the conclusion
of the treaty has the power later to declare that it is in conflict
with the Constitution.
The problem is a serious one because although it is not likely
to happen that a government signs and ratifies an international
convention which clearly violates its Constitution, it might occur
that in its judgment any such violation does not exist, and later
the courts through the claim of some private person may declare
that the treaty violates the Constitution.
17. FENWICK, INTERNATIONAL LAW 434 (3d ed. 1948).
18. See article 11 of the Convention on Treaties of 1928 (Havana).
19. JIMtNEZ DE AwtCHAGA, CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 82 (mimeo-
graphed shorthand notes by J. B. Miguez, 1949).
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No matter how disturbing such a declaration may be to the
international order, I believe that it must be accepted as effective
to deprive the treaty of validity in an internal order, because the
Constitution is the supreme law and over it nothing can prevail.
We must bear in mind that to the peoples of America the
Constitution is something more than the document that contains
the political organization of the nation; it is also the fundamental
charter that guarantees the individual rights and protects man
against the abuses of power. If it should be admitted that a
treaty can derogate the Constitution we would be opening the
door so that, through international conventions, the Executive
in connivance with Congress or with the Senate, might change
constitutional provisions and deprive the citizens of some of
their rights. I realize that this is the very fear that was ex-
pressed one hundred and sixty years ago by Mr. Gallatin in the
United States House of Representatives, and that history has
shown that his fear was more theoretical than real, but, at all
events, the possibility exists. I realize that the doctrine of the
subordination of the treaty to the Constitution is an obstacle to
the development of international law; but whatever may be the
opinion that is maintained in a theoretical order, the fact is that
we have not yet reached the stage in which national courts are
willing to accept a different solution.
The problem is a specially delicate one as against the other
contracting State which in good faith accepted the convention
believing it to be perfect. I believe that it is necessary to dis-
tinguish between the effect of a treaty upon the signatory States
and upon private individuals. With regard to the latter, if an
interested party contests the convention and succeeds in having
the national court declare it in conflict with the Constitution,
there is no doubt that, just as occurs in the case of the laws, it
cannot continue to be applied as an effective rule in the internal
order. But the other State might have grounds for a claim in
the international field in order that it be indemnified for dam-
ages that it or its citizens may have suffered. However, this
problem is outside the topic we are considering.20
Another question that is closely connected to this subject is
20. To meet this contingency, the government of the United States has inserted
in some treaties (e.g., treaty with Japan of May 31, 1928) a clause providing that
in case it could not fulfill the convention due to a judicial decision, the treaty
would be considered as no longer in force. See DE VISScuER, DE LA coNCLUSIoN
DES TRAIT]tS INTERNATIONAUX 88 (1943).
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to know whether the remedy granted to contest laws that are in
conflict with the Constitution can be used against treaties.
Limiting this question to Cuba, our Supreme Court decided
the question negatively in its Decision No. 8 of March 10, 1911
(in a matter of constitutionality), because article 83 of the 1901
Cuban Constitution, as well as the supplementary law of March
31, 1903, allowed an appeal exclusively against the laws, decrees
and regulations which infringe upon the Constitution, but did
not mention treaties; and although these are on an equal basis
with the laws, it could not be interpreted that such assimilation
was so complete in order to consider them included under the
generical term of laws used by the Constitution.
I believe that the solution today would be different because
article 174, section (d) of the 1940 Constitution grants a judicial
remedy against "laws, decree-laws, decrees, regulations, resolu-
tions, orders and provisions and other acts of any organ, author-
ity or official." And article 127-bis of the Organic Law of the
Judicial Power promulgated to apply this provision of the Con-
stitution speaks of "laws, resolution-laws, decree-laws, decrees,
regulations, resolutions, orders, rulings, provisions, measures or
other acts of any organ or power of the State, organization,
authority, official or autonomous organization." Those articles
are so broad that even though treaties are not expressly men-
tioned, they are undoubtedly included in that list. For that rea-
son I believe that it is almost certain that our Supreme Court
would reverse its doctrine and recognize the possibility of mak-
ing use of the appeal in tests of constitutionality against treaties.
Conflict between a treaty and the national law. A treaty may
be in conflict with a previous law but this is a point that offers
no difficulties either in doctrine or in the courts. Both having
recognized that treaties have the force of law, the logical conse-
quence is that when an international convention takes effect, all
the laws that are in conflict therewith are expressly or tacitly
repealed. As the Brazilian jurist Philadelpho Azevedo has said,
"if the law is previous there really is no problem, because the
treaty is a later law that abrogates the previous one."'2 1 The same
doctrine has been admitted by the Supreme Court of the United
States: "A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress."
(Thomas v. Gay, 169 U.S. 264 [1897]). The matter was succinct-
21. Azevedo, El conflicto de interpretaci6n entre el tratado internacional V la
le interna, in REV. D.J.A. 161 (June 1914).
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ly stated by Justice Cardozo: "A treaty, if in force, is the su-
preme law of the land and supersedes all local laws inconsistent
with its terms." (Techt v. Hughes, 229 N.Y. 222, 128 N.E. 185
[1920]).
The problem of whether a treaty may be modified by a later
law is much more complex. If we study it from the viewpoint of
the doctrine and in the decisions of the Supreme Court of the
United States, the answer is in the affirmative: "An Act of Con-
gress may supersede a prior treaty and if it is repugnant to it to
that extent abrogates it." (The Cherokee Tobacco, 79 U.S. (11
Wall.) 616 [1870]). That is the logical solution under the sys-
tem of the full equivalence of the law and of a treaty. If a treaty,
because it has the force of law, can abrogate the law, the later
law in turn can abrogate the treaty.
The same doctrine has been accepted by the Cuban courts.
In decision No. 561 of October 4, 1949 (in a contentious adminis-
trative matter), the Supreme Court of Cuba declared that a tax
created by Law No. 28 of 1941 could be collected, in spite of the
fact that the law was in conflict with the treaty signed with
Spain in 1927, because the law as such was binding on the courts
and because the treaty had no hierarchy or force greater than
that of the law. In decision No. 193 of November 2, 1950 (in a
matter of constitutionality) it was declared that article 142, sec-
tion (g) of the Cuban Constitution does not say that a treaty has
binding force greater than that provided in the law. And in five
decisions handed down in 1951 (Nos. 224, 236, 328, 404, and 849
in contentious-administrative matters) the following was said:
"Aside from the respect which the clauses of treaties are worthy
of in the order of government to government relations, from a
strictly legal standpoint, they can have no other effect than that
accorded them by the national juridical regime to which they
must necessarily be subordinated; and with regard to the pro-
visions of the Constitution of the Republic regarding the same,
said treaties do not have the force of constitutional rules nor do
they appear to be vested with a binding force greater than that
of the law which, because it is enacted by Congress, represents
the sovereign will of the people; wherefore in a conflict between
the former and the latter, only similar in certain aspects, as the
Supreme Court en banc declared on March 10, 1911, the law of a
later date should be applied in accordance with the principles
governing the matter."
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That is the viewpoint gathered from the decisions of our
courts, and I imagine that the situation must be the same in the
majority of the Latin-American countries due to the generality
of said doctrine. 22 However, there is a tendency against this view,
that is, the contrary thesis that a treaty cannot be abrogated by
a subsequent national law. The latter is the European tendency
as contained in article 28 of the French Constitution and as fol-
lowed by some Latin-American writers23 (Accioly, Sol6rzano,
Azevedo, Planas Suirez, Chediak, Rabasa). Azevedo cites a
decision of the Federal Supreme Court of Brazil (January 7,
1914) and Cruchaga Ossa mentions two decisions, one of the
Chilean Supreme Court (November 25, 1919) and another of
the Supreme Court of Guatemala (March 31, 1937), all of which
upheld the validity of treaties as against later laws that were in
conflict with them.
The problem, it seems to me, is one of supremacy of norms.
The juridical rules may be of several kinds, each one with its
own special value. The most current classification is the tri-
partite division into constitutional, legal, and regulatory norms.
That is, the Constitution prevails over the law and the regula-
tions; the law prevails over the regulations, but cannot be in
conflict with the Constitution; and the regulations can neither
conflict with the law nor with the Constitution. Where does a
treaty come in under this classification? The decisions of the
Supreme Court of the United States and of Cuba vest a treaty
with the same value as a law and consequently give it the same
juridical value. Consequently, a treaty is subordinated to the
Constitution and above the regulation; but inasmuch as it is on
the same plane as a law and has the same force, it abrogates the
prior law and is superseded by that promulgated after it.
The principle - adopted by the Supreme Courts of Cuba
and of the United States - that the law supersedes a prior treaty
is based on the assumption that both have the same effect, "but
22. See JIMItNEZ DE ARItCHAGA, CURSO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 82 (mimeo-
graphed shorthand notes by J. B. Miguez, 1949).
23. 2 ACCIOLY, TRATADO DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PItBLICO, no. 1252(1946) ; Sol6rzano, La obligatoriedad de los tratados internacionales en las rela-
ciones privada8, in REV. DE DERECHO INTERNACIONAL (LA HABANA) 26 (September
1930) ; Azevedo, El conflicto de interpretaci6n entre el tratado internacional y la
le interna, in REV. D.J.A. 162 (June 1914); 1 PLANAS SUi&REZ, TRATADO DE
DERECHO INTERNACIONAL PItBLICO 151 (1916) ; CHEDIAK, APLICACIN DE LAS CON-
VENCIONES INTERNACIONALES POR EL DERECHO NACIONAL 7 (1937); Cruchaga
Ossa, Relaciones entre el derecho internacional y las legislaciones nacionales, in 10
PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTt AMERICAN SCIENTIFIC CONGRESS 60 (1940)
RABASA, EL DERECHO INTERNO Y EL DERECHO INTERNACIONAL 102 (1933).
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disregards the fact that the nature of the treaty is not exactly
the same as that of the law, and that the methods of their crea-
tion are also different.
In the first place, it dispenses with the contractual aspects
of treaties and in so doing admits, under international law, the
possibility that contracts may be freely changed by only one of
the parties thereto. This is a violation of the rule pacta sunt
servanda which not only is one of the most ancient and firmly
established rules in the relations between peoples, but in Amer-
ica is part of its positive law as shown by the following pro-
visions of the Charter of the Organization of American States
which we might call the Constitution of the Continent: "Article
5.- The American States reaffirm the following principles:
* . . (b) International order consists essentially of respect for
the personality, sovereignty and independence of States, and the
faithful fulfillment of obligations derived from treaties and
other sources of international law," and "Article 14.- Respect
for and faithful observance of treaties constitute standards for
the development of peaceful relations among States."
In the second place, a law and a treaty are born in a different
manner. The law is the exclusive product of the will of a Con-
gress; therefore, the Congress can abrogate by itself that which
it established. But as the powers of the two States have to inter-
vene in the making of a treaty, it does not seem admissible for
the Legislative Power of one of them, by itself, to be able to
destroy what also required the will of the other State to be cre-
ated. It is true that denouncement is the unilateral form of
putting an end to a treaty, but aside from the fact that such is a
method accepted by international law, it requires the interven-
tion of the other party even though this be in a passive manner,
when it is advised that the convention is not to continue in force.
National sovereignty has also been invoked unmindful of the
fact that it acts at the time that it decides whether the treaty be
signed or not; but once it has been signed, it cannot authorize
its unilateral invalidation through a law, thus infringing the
essential rules of international life.
Reflecting the criterion that treaties cannot be changed in
such a manner, article 10 of the 1928 Havana Convention pro-
vides that "No State can relieve itself of the obligations of a
treaty or modify its stipulations except by the agreement, se-
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cured through peaceful means, of the other contracting parties."
The acceptance of the rule that a treaty cannot be modified
or superseded by a national law implies an admission that it con-
stitutes a separate category in the hierarchic scale of the rules,
placed under the Constitution and above the laws and the regu-
lations. Thus we would have four classes, in this order: the
Constitution, treaties, laws, regulations. It is interesting to state
that article 28 of the French Constitution provides that "diplo-
matic treaties that are properly ratified and published shall have
a higher authority than that of internal laws; their provisions
may not be abrogated, modified or suspended except as a conse-
quence or a regular denouncement notified through diplomatic
channels."
This criterion means that since a treaty is an act of interna-
tional law, which arises by virtue of a special procedure and is
extinguished by precise causes, it cannot be abrogated by a
method that is entirely different and inapplicable, as is a law,
by an internal and unilateral act.
Finally, let us see what basis this thesis finds in the Cuban
Constitution. In the first place, its article 7 provides that "the
Cuban State accepts the principles and practices of international
law that promote human solidarity, respect for the sovereignty
of peoples, reciprocity among States and peace and universal
civilizations."
If this precept is something more than a mere lyric declara-
tion, it does mean that our Constitution accepts the principles of
international law which it mentions in a general way. It is the
duty of the courts of justice, especially the Supreme Court, to
determine what those principles are, a function in which it must
of course act with the greatest care. But regardless of how
strict the selection may be, there is no doubt that one of the most
ancient postulates and one firmly imbedded in international law,
is that of respect for treaties which, as we have already observed,
has already become positive law for the countries of America by
being incorporated in articles 5 and 14 of the Charter of the Or-
ganization of American States inserted above. And undoubtedly
that principle has been infringed when a treaty is unilaterally
abrogated by a law originating solely from one of the parties.
On the other hand, section (g) of article 142 of our Cuban
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Constitution, in providing that international treaties concluded
by the President must be submitted "to the approval of the Sen-
ate without which requisite they will have no binding force upon
the Republic," is implicitly saying that when the Senate has ap-
proved them they are valid and binding on the Republic, that is,
that what has been stipulated therein becomes an obligation con-
stitutionally recognized by the Republic, and since the Republic
and the Constitution stand above Congress and the laws, the rule
inserted in the treaty ranks above the law and cannot be modi-
fied or abrogated by it unilaterally. I believe that the Supreme
Court failed to see the full scope of this provision when in its
decision No. 193 of November 2, 1950, it said that "it is limited
to a description of the requisites that a treaty should fulfill in
order that it may bind the Republic, but it does not provide the
place it holds in the hierarchy of the norms and much less that
it is superior, in its binding force, to what is provided in the
law."
Retroactive effect of a treaty. As a general rule, treaties are
not effective until after the exchange or deposit of ratifications;
but the contracting States may set a different date for that pur-
pose. Internationalists have greatly argued whether treaties
have or do not have retroactive effects, some supporting the af-
firmative view (e.g., Bluntschli, Laghi) while others believe
otherwise (e.g., Pessoa, Field, Accioly, Oppenheim).
Herschey and Hyde, by following the Supreme Court of the
United States, distinguish between the effects on the signatory
States and the effects on private individuals. Hyde says: "It is
laid down as a rule of the law of nations, that in the absence of
special agreement, a treaty upon the exchange of ratifications
operates retroactively, as from the date of signature. This is
said to be true, however, only so far as the agreement concerns
the relation between State and State. With respect to the rights
of private individuals, the date of operation, unless otherwise
specified, is regarded as simultaneous with that of the exchange
of ratifications. A treaty does not operate retroactively so as to
affect vested rights acquired before the compact was concluded or
signed by the signatory parties. ' 24 Bustamante is of the opinion
that the retroactiveness "should not be applied save under very
special circumstances when the ratification seems to be assured
and will be rapid and when the retroactive effect does not affect
24. 2 IyDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 49 (1922).
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prior constitutional or legal provisions that involve vested
rights."25
In the field of Cuban positive law, the Constitution, in articles
21 and 22, admits the retroactive effect of criminal laws and pro-
hibits it as to other laws, except when the law so provides for
reasons of public order, of social utility or of national necessity,
expressly mentioned in the law. Even so, the affirmative vote
of two-thirds of the Senate and of the House of Representatives
is required, and if the reasons for the retroactivity should be
contested, the Supreme Court may decide the question. The Con-
stitutions of thirteen other Latin-American countries also estab-
lish the non-retroactivity of the laws.
2 6
The Cuban Supreme Court (Decision No. 67 of September
13, 1905) said that the Treaty of Peace signed by the United
States with Spain on December 10, 1898, produced its effects,
not from the date of ratification on April 11, 1899, but from the
time of its signing; but aside from the fact that at that time the
Cuban Constitution did not exist, special circumstances con-
curred in that decision that do not allow the conclusion that the
retroactivity of treaties was admitted by the court as a general
rule.27
Inasmuch as the purpose of prohibiting the retroactive effect
of laws has been to protect the individual against the abuses of
power and because treaties have been placed on an equal basis
with national laws as to their effect, I believe that the said con-
stitutional prohibition is also applicable thereto and consequently
it is possible for the Judicial Power to declare a treaty unconsti-
tutional because it is retroactive.
With regard to private interests I also believe that in the mat-
ter of retroactivity not the date of ratification should be consid-
ered but that of the promulgation of the treaty.
CONCLUSIONS
We can summarize what we believe is the general trend in
25. 3 BUST&MANTE, DERECHO INTERNACIONAL P16BLICO no. 753 (1936).
26. Bolivia, article 31; Brazil, article 141, 30; Costa Rica, article 34, Domini-
can Republic, article 42; Haiti, article 13; Honduras, article 54; Mexico, article
14; Nicaragua, article 123; Panama, article 44; Paraguay, article 26; Peru, article
25; Venezuela, article 30; El Salvador, article 172.
27. The same can be said of decision No. 67, Jurisp. al Dia (Cont.-Adm.) 89
(May 5, 1930), in which the Convention on Trade Marks with Chile, 1923, was
applied retroactively.
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Latin-American law on the problem discussed in this paper, as
follows:
1. An international treaty to be valid and effective in na-
tional courts has to be approved in accordance with the consti-
tutional rules of each country.
2. To be effective in regard to private individuals it has to
be duly promulgated or published.
3. The Constitution is above the treaty, so if the treaty vio-
lates the Constitution, it may be declared invalid by the courts.
If the constitutional rule has been adopted after the treaty came
into force, the national courts will probably decide that the treaty
cannot be applied to private individuals, but the other State will
be entitled to a claim in the international sphere.
4. The treaty is equivalent to a law. Consequently, it abro-
gates a previous national law, and is, in turn, superseded by a
later law. But in my opinion the solution should be that the local
law cannot abrogate an international treaty.
5. In regard to the vested rights of individuals, the treaty
normally does not have retroactive effects, especially when the
Constitution prohibits the retroactivity of law.
In closing these comments, I wish to express my thanks to the
organizers of this regional meeting of the American Society of
International Law for having invited me to take part in the pro-
ceedings. I regret that the short time at my disposal did not per-
mit me to make a deeper and more detailed study of the ques-
tion and more in line with the high scientific level of those that
have been listening to me. But I trust that my remarks have not
entirely lacked interest and that they have succeeded in giving
you a general outlook on the aspects of the problem that I have
studied in this paper in connection with Latin-America.
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